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Abstract
Enterprise blockchain projects have great promise. They can cut costs and promote efficiency through disintermediation, increase
transparency for tracking intercompany transactions, expand knowledge through consortia databases, and improve workflows through
shared business processes. Despite its potential, blockchain technology has failed to produce promised benefits for enterprise networks.
While the underlying technology has advanced rapidly, managerial capabilities needed to form and manage blockchain consortia have
lagged, and as a result, few consortia have succeeded. This chapter reviews the extant literature on blockchain consortia and provides a
framework that identifies (1) foundational conditions that precede effective consortium formation, (2) capabilities required for effective
consortium functioning and evolution, and (3) partner and ecosystem-level outcomes associated with successful blockchain projects.
Keywords: enterprise blockchain, blockchain consortium, blockchain consortia, strategic capabilities, success factors
JEL Classifications: M15 IT Management
1.

Introduction

Blockchain technology has the potential to fundamentally
change the way businesses collaborate and to solve business
problems in ways not previously possible [1, 2, 3]. Promised
benefits include streamlined processes, cost savings, risk
reduction, and improved stakeholder relationships [4]. Despite
its potential, the technology has not been widely adopted and
early adopters have encountered problems and challenges [5].
While the underlying information technology continues to
advance rapidly, the development of business capabilities
necessary for creating and capturing value continue to lag [6].
This is particularly true for consortium blockchain solutions,
which require the formation and governance of cooperative
networks [7].
Consortium blockchains are interorganisational systems that
enable organisations to integrate their business operations and
data [8]. For such systems, the organisational component is
critical because people, their ideas, and decision-making
processes are all affected [9]. Networks of organisations and
associated business workflows span supply chains or industries,
and in some cases, external stakeholders [10]. Participants may
include trading partners along supply chains that serve a shared
base of end customers; they may be made up of competitors
operating in the same industry sector; they may include a mix of
public and private firms. Although participating organisations
vary, the hallmark of consortia is that the partners collaborate to
solve shared problems [11].
Blockchain projects require a broader range of business
capabilities than do typical enterprise alliances [6]. Blockchain
consortia are complex organisational arrangements where
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

partners must collaborate on the purpose, operations, and
desired outcomes of the project, which represent a new way of
organising interfirm collaboration [1]. Member firms, and the
consortium as a whole, must possess a variety of skills and
attitudes. Because blockchain is typically treated as a technology
problem, the business capabilities required for successful
consortia are not widely recognised or discussed. While
scholarly literature is beginning to emerge, it focuses primarily
on technological issues and ignores or minimises organisational
complexities [5, 12, 13].
In the remainder of this chapter, we review the extant
literature on blockchain consortia and examine the capabilities
needed for the successful formation and management of these
solutions. Although several studies touch on consortium
governance, we note a significant gap in research addressing
criteria associated with consortium effectiveness. We build
upon academic research and trade literature to propose a
framework that identifies (1) foundational conditions that
precede effective consortium formation, (2) capabilities
required for effective consortium functioning and evolution,
and (3) partner and ecosystem-level outcomes associated with
successful blockchain projects. We believe that the ability to
effectively form and manage blockchain consortia plays an
important role in promoting value co-creation and capture and
in supporting innovation. By presenting a framework based on
systematic research, our aim is to contribute to these
objectives.
2.

Literature Review

To summarise current studies focused on blockchain
consortia, we conducted a systematic literature review using
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the Web of Science academic database in June 2021. To ensure
the broadest possible coverage, our search includes results for:
enterprise blockchain or blockchain consortia or blockchain
consortium. No date restrictions were used to ensure
comprehensive results. Two important trends emerge from the
425 papers returned.
First, enterprise blockchain and blockchain consortia are a
relatively new and quickly growing area of study. Results span
an approximately four-year period, with the earliest published
in July 2017 and the latest scheduled for publication in August
2021. Seven papers included in the results were published in
2017, while 135 (32% of the total) were published or available
for early access during the first half of 2021.

Table 1: Analysis of Literature Results by Category
Topic of Article
Applications

Count
39

Percent (%)
55

Technical overview/proof of concept
Adoption challenges/
determinants/consequences
Privacy/security/regulation
Cryptocurrency
Literature review
Consortium formation and
governance

9

13

7
6
3
3

10
8
4
4

4

6

Total

71

100

Web of Science Subdisciplines Included: Business, Finance, Information
Science, Law, Management, and Operations.

Figure 1: Web of Science Search Results by Discipline.

Second, enterprise blockchain and blockchain consortia are
of interest to a diverse set of academic disciplines. Figure 1
aggregates search results into a visualisation comparing the
number of results returned by discipline. The chart highlights
the extent to which enterprise blockchain concepts are
largely studied within disciplines that solve technical
challenges preventing adoption and widespread use. A review
of the results for various subdisciplines associated with
computer science, telecommunications, engineering, and
other hard science disciplines show rapid progress on
technical challenges preventing adoption. While interesting
and important, these findings are not the focus of this
chapter.
Instead, we focus on the social and governance challenges that
must be overcome to establish enterprise blockchains as a tool
for strategic value creation. As such, we highlight the 71
results returned for various socialscience subdisciplines
associated with business, management, finance, information
science, operations, and law for additional analysis.1 Each of
these articles was reviewed and categorised according to the
paper’s motivation and contribution. In all, we identified seven
article categories.

1

The three articles excluded from further analysis include an introduction to a
special issue, in one, and two other articles in which the study of blockchain
technology was not a primary focus.
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Table 1 presents our categorisation of the motivation and
contribution of papers selected for further analysis. The most
common type of paper included within the subset is the
application of blockchain technology to a specific task or
market. Such articles make up 55% of the total. Each of these
papers discusses how the application of blockchain technology
could reduce cost or improve performance within a specific
setting. Highly cited examples include the description of
benefits
to
blockchain
adoption
in
supply
chain/manufacturing [14, 15, 16, 17], accounting/auditing [15,
18], financial services [19, 20], healthcare [21, 22, 23, 24], and
utility markets [25]. While these papers make significant
contributions to the general understanding and proliferation of
blockchain technology, they do not focus on the unique
challenges involved in consortium formation and governance.
The second most common type of paper included within the
subset is a technical overview or proof of concept for a
specific improvement to the blockchain ecosystem. Such
articles make up 22% of those selected for additional analysis.
Examples include summaries of technical developments in
certain areas or within the blockchain ecosystem as a whole
[26, 27], security/privacy [28, 29, 30], latency [31], error
management [32], and consensus mechanisms [33, 34].
Technological issues have long concerned companies
exploring blockchain adoption. Firms need to know that the
solutions they invest in will continue to meet their needs over
time. Such contributions help to overcome technical
challenges within the blockchain ecosystem but do not focus
on challenges related to consortium formation and
governance.
Other categories within the identified subset include analyses
of challenges, determinants, or consequences of blockchain
adoption (10%) [35, 36, 37]; discussion of privacy, security, or
regulatory challenges (8%) [38, 39, 40, 41]; a focus on
cryptocurrency (4%) [42, 43]; or literature reviews (4%) [44,
45]. A final category includes papers that explicitly deal with
the primary focus of this chapter: challenges related to
consortium formation and governance (6%). As this category
contains studies related to the primary concerns of this
chapter, we will briefly summarise relevant examples.
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Lacity [46] uses a series of cases to propose a set of questions
organisations should consider when considering enterprise
blockchain applications. The author provides an overview of
circumstances where blockchain is preferable to other
database solutions, and notes a variety of resources that could
be used to develop viable solutions. Resources discussed
include relevant standards, regulatory considerations, and
shared governance models.
Zavolokina et al. [47] highlight trust, collaboration, and
regulatory compliance as key inputs for blockchain consortium
success. Their case analysis suggests a set of strategies that
include initial membership of non-competing organisations,
segregated platform/private and infrastructure/public
benefits, and separate short- and long-term priorities.
Nathan and Jacobs [48] provide a brief overview of
consortium strategy considerations alongside a discussion of
blockchain applications in financial services. They emphasize
the need for an overarching vision or strategy to guide
consortium formation, membership criteria, technology
supported, governance process, data management, and
regulatory concerns. While discussion of each topic within the
paper is of limited depth, each of the topics raised is important
topics for future research and development.

workflows, business models, and corporate strategy at the
highest level [46]. It demands strategic, organisational, and
market coordination that is able to address all stakeholder
interests [57].
The success of an enterprise blockchain project relies on the
effective creation and management of consortia. This
requires certain enabling conditions to be present prior to
consortium formation and for the consortium to possess a
number of core capabilities that enable it to effectively
organise and govern activity [47]. Business leaders
understand the potential benefits to blockchain consortia but
remain concerned with issues around “co-opetition,” or
partnering with competitors or pseudo-competitors, even
though such collaboration is critical [1, 50]. When
collaboratively developed and managed, a consortium is
positioned to benefit individual partners and the broader
ecosystem [47]. When they are not, the blockchain project
will likely fail to deliver anticipated benefits. Despite the
importance of coordination and planning, Naqvi and
Hussain [58] find that many projects fail to use high-quality
evidence and critical appraisal to evaluate projects before
they are implemented or after they are in operation.

Finally, Schwabe [49] examines the unique role public agencies
can play within blockchain consortia. While the paper does not
explicitly focus on consortium formation and governance, it
does emphasise the need for data access, user trust, and data
quality. Mechanisms for achieving those goals beyond public
agency participation are not discussed.
3. Consortium Capabilities Framework
While technology continues to advance, the organisational
factors that drive enterprise blockchain success need additional
attention. Blockchains span technical, functional, social, and
legal boundaries within business [50]. Consortia must
harmonise diverse stakeholder views within companies and
across the broader network in order to be successful [51]. As a
result, blockchain solutions require consortium partners to
share information and coordinate in new ways.
Process coordination and data sharing across organisations is
an entirely new way of doing business for some participants
[52, 53, 54]. Hurder [55] describes blockchain platforms as
economic systems: “Blockchain-based consortia allow
enterprises to share, buy, and sell valuable data and use that
pooled data to create new goods and services which can then
be monetized.” The paper notes network effects that result
from the number of partners in an ecosystem, driving growth
in value as more members are added to the consortium
network and as costs can be spread among them [55]. Despite
the potential for such benefits, forming and operating
consortia may require members to accept agreements that
challenge long-held belief systems or underlying business
models [56]. Such collaboration may require changes to
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

Figure 2: Consortium Capabilities Framework.

Figure 2 depicts a blockchain consortium capabilities
framework that describes inputs, processes, and outputs
associated with successful consortia. Partner-level factors are
lightly shaded. Consortium-level factors are darkly shaded.
Conditions for success are inputs and necessary antecedents to
effective blockchain consortia. These conditions primarily
refer to the blockchain’s promise for addressing problems
shared by the consortia, or factors driving member buy-in and
fitness for participation. Consortium capabilities are processes or
capabilities possessed by the consortium as a whole.
Collectively, consortium participants must have the capacity to
assess current functions and resources, govern the consortium
effectively, maintain technological strengths, and act
strategically to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the
consortium. Outputs include intermediate and long-term
performance improvements and value creation for both
individual participants and the consortium as a whole.
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3.1. Conditions for Success

3.1.2

The first section of the framework outlines the initial
conditions necessary to form successful consortia. These
conditions should be present or be developed before the
consortium partnership is formalised. They include both
consortium-level and individual-partner-level capabilities. A
proposed use case should be one where a traditional system is
not well-suited, blockchain offers superior performance, and
initial participants share a vision for what the consortium can
accomplish. Individual partners joining the consortium should
possess or build the technical and administrative capabilities
that will be needed to participate in and benefit from the
network.

Prospective partners must have a shared vision for a
blockchain project’s purpose and benefits to attract the
investment and commitment necessary for project success.
Each individual participant may benefit differently, but the
consortium must agree upon collective benefits from
collaboration and share an understanding of how they will be
realised through the blockchain network.

3.1.1

Relevant Use Case

The success of a blockchain solution rests on the development
of an appropriate use case. There are many decision models
for determining whether a particular use case can be best
solved using blockchain. Wust and Gervais [59] suggest that a
private permissioned blockchain is appropriate when the state
of assets or agreements must be recorded by multiple, known
parties and for which a trusted-third-party solution is
unavailable or is more costly than a blockchain solution. PwC
[60] adds the condition that transactions created by different
participants are time-sensitive interactions, such that the ability
to rapidly share information has business benefits. Naqvi and
Hussein [58] through The Centre for Evidence Based
Blockchain provide a more expansive analysis. They provide a
comprehensive framework that can be used by organizations
and consortia to anticipate and evaluate the probable
outcomes of various blockchain use cases.
The existence of cross-enterprise workflows and multi-party
transactions helps to develop a clear and relevant use case to
drive successful adoption [61]. For example, supply chain
consortia may include partners engaged in coordinated
planning for material movement and handoffs or for shared
regulatory compliance; finance industry consortia may share
costs associated with customer verification and anti-money
laundering requirements; cross-industry consortia may share
scarce resources such as docking locations in a port or space
inside a grain silo. The ability to share information in a
validated, secure, and up-to-date format, or to automate
actions through smart contracts, can create benefits for all
parties [61].
The need for real-time information sharing presents a clear
advantage for blockchain solutions. Traditional enterprise
resource planning (ERP) and other enterprise systems do not
share information easily, and in some sectors, rely on outdated
electronic data interchange (EDI) systems or even on emailed
spreadsheets [62]. This can result in delayed access to
information, wasted time, and reconciliation difficulties due to
error or fraud [63]. Blockchain systems allow partners to
record, share, and aggregate data in real time. The result is
greater visibility of activities and more immediate decisions.
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

Shared Vision

Participants need a shared ecosystem mission. This mission shapes
the current and future contours and benefits for the jointly
developed distributed system. Problems arise when a
blockchain addresses important issues for its founding
organisations but fails to provide the same level of benefit for
future participants. This was a problem for the IBM Maersk
Trade Lens blockchain as it sought to expand. German
company Hapag-Lloyd would not join a consortium controlled
by competitors Maersk and IBM until the platform made
governance changes that benefitted the industry more broadly
[64]. Ideally, consortia will be formed and they grow with a
high-level ecosystem mission associated with transparency,
security, provenance, and equality. While participants will have
their own reasons for joining, the ecosystem as a whole should
have a mission that supersedes the interests of a few powerful
partners.
A positive value proposition for every blockchain participant is
essential. Blockchain participation and its associated process
and technological changes make the technology costly and
risky. These investments must be outweighed by the value
created and captured by every current and future blockchain
participant. While each initial participant in a consortium must
weigh its own costs and benefits, many fail to anticipate the
return on investment for future members. In many cases,
network effects are realised when the value of the network for
an individual participant increases as the network grows [65],
so it is important to anticipate the likely business case for
those who might join in the future.
Blockchain requires a collaborative mindset in which value is
generated through cooperation. Strategic positioning and
strategic advantage are based on the philosophy that
companies achieve long-term success when they consistently
outperform competitors, but such thinking can be
counterproductive for blockchain consortia. Many large
companies participate in strategic alliances that are built on
cooperation, or often more aptly “co-opetition,” but these are
often short-term collaborations among a small group of
partners. Blockchain consortia typically have no predetermined endpoint and include tens, hundreds, or thousands
of participants. Participants must collaborate to securely share
processes, information, or other resources. Partners must
govern the network in a manner agreeable to current and
future participants. The World Economic Forum [66] states “it
is critical to reach agreement on not just the initial value levers
to be pursued by the ecosystem but also the longer-term vision
to be pursued.”

Published Open Access under the CC-BY 4.0 Licence

4

3.1.3

Partner Competencies

Partners in a blockchain collaboration can benefit from a
number of competencies required to develop and manage a
consortium that generates value. Individual competencies will
strongly influence whether the partner will achieve a return
from blockchain investment. Further, individual partner
success is instrumental in the success of the consortium.
Blockchain participants benefit from prior domain area
knowledge and expertise related to the blockchain solution in
development. Companies typically collaborate in areas where
they are already subject matter experts, such as financial
services for R3 or track and trace for FoodTrust. In some
cases, however, companies explore blockchain solutions that
extend beyond current expertise. TaxChain, for example,
enables importers to validate trade certificates and the Plastic
Bank provides a way for companies to provide evidence that
they are achieving claimed sustainability goals. Although some
of the partners in these blockchains have domain area
expertise, others need to develop expertise in order to
maximise potential value from the blockchain project.
Distributed technologies are new and require significant
technical knowledge and development expertise in participating
organisations. While many blockchain projects are guided by
SaaS providers such as IBM and Accenture [67], participants
typically need a level of blockchain competence in their IT
functions. Information stored on the blockchain will flow to,
or be compared with, information in the company’s ERP and
other systems. IT staff will need to integrate these systems
appropriately. Control and permissioning of blockchain access
must also be managed, and technologists will need processes
for key assignment and management. Many firms will need
blockchain-specific skills, such as the ability to manage a
validator node and maintain consensus with other partners.
Technology staff may also need the ability to understand, test,
modify, and create smart contracts or to oversee those
functions. Pre-audited contract templates are increasingly
available, and contract developers and auditors can be engaged
for idiosyncratic contracts. High-level applications facilitate the
creation and testing of smart contracts and the use of predeveloped code libraries or domain-specific apps. IT staff may
be tasked with using these solutions.
Relational capabilities allow firms to establish and maintain
beneficial relationships with partner organisations. Relationships
enable a firm to access information and resources necessary for
project success that would otherwise be unavailable. Blockchain
consortia may include companies that have no prior
relationships, or have a past history of ineffective partnership.
Individual blockchain participants need to form relationships
with transacting partners that enable collaboration in transaction
processing and governance decisions. For partners with whom
they will transact directly, firms also need the ability to
collaborate on restructured business processes to accommodate
effective blockchain innovation and use.
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

Blockchain projects have been described as mini-economies
[11], which suggest a need for platform-level economic analysis.
Participants in these projects contribute numerous resources
to system development and maintenance. Firms need the
ability to evaluate the economic benefits associated with these
investments. These systems are often designed to reduce
inefficiencies and smooth frictions in marketplace interactions
[68]. Their economic benefits may flow from coordination, the
ability to immediately and economically share information, the
ability to ensure execution and manage risk through smart
contracts and control, and the ability to maintain data and
regulate permissions.
Blockchain solutions provide numerous opportunities for
value creation and value capture by consortia members [6].
Operational benefits from enterprise blockchains include
reduced costs through disintermediation or enhanced
reconciliation, improved processes through enhanced
coordination and information sharing, and reduced
counterparty risks. These solutions create opportunities for
new sources of competitive advantage through the
development of new products, processes, or business models.
Companies with the capacity to sense and seize these
opportunities will need to reconfigure their organisations in
order to capitalise on them. Successful firms will be poised to
extract value from their participation in enterprise blockchain
consortia. Participants will also gain competencies that enable
them to capitalise upon future blockchain projects should the
opportunity arise.
3.2 Consortium Capabilities
Consortium capabilities are necessary competences for a
consortium to survive, evolve, and continue to produce value
for its members. These competencies exist at the consortium
level rather than at the individual participant level. Some
consortia are structured as stand-alone entities while others
take the form of alliances between independent partners. No
matter the structure, the consortium will need capabilities that
differ from those of the individual partners. Participants
possess diverse capabilities and differentially contribute to
consortium success. Each organisation will have its own
strategic expertise but will also benefit from consortium
capabilities distributed across the network.

3.2.1

Situational Assessment

Situational assessment is an ability to monitor and assess the
resources, assets, and other benefits possessed by or available to
consortium participants. Because the framework addresses the
consortium’s strategic, technical, and governance capabilities
separately, the focus here is on consortium operations. A
consortium needs to regularly assess its resources and whether
they are consistent with day-to-day needs. Resources include
financial contributions by partners or generated by the
consortium, the technology currently possessed, data owned and
controlled, human resources dedicated to consortium
operations, brand or reputation, relationships between the
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consortium and outsiders such as regulators or potential
technology providers, and other tangible and intangible assets
that could be used to create value.
Assessments will also examine current partners and their level
of commitment to the consortium – including their ongoing
commitment and support for the consortium’s current and
strategic goals. A consortium should monitor its ability to
cultivate potential partners, attract new partners, and retain
existing partners. As appropriate, the consortium might also
assess the degree to which it is successful in attracting highprofile partners and partners that possess specific desired
capabilities or resources.
Regular documentation and assessment of workflows is another
opportunity to provide value. As partners move into and out
of roles and committees, they will need to understand how the
day-to-day work of the consortium is accomplished.
Workflows associated with partner relationships should be
documented and shared at the consortium level, as shared IoT
and communications standards and workflows increase the
consortium’s value to partners [61]. A full shared knowledge
base of past, present, and planned workflows can also be
valuable.
Regular assessment of external actors’ needs and expectations
from a consortium is also important. All actors that affect or
are affected by the consortium’s operations should be
identified, with inputs and impacts regularly evaluated.
Examples include governing bodies, standards organisations,
tax and customs authorities, financing organisations, nonpartner suppliers and customers of the consortium, and media.
Regular and thorough situational assessment and
communication of this information among consortium
partners lays the groundwork for ongoing work around
strategy and governance.

3.2.2

Governance

Effective governance is perhaps the most foundational
element in blockchain success. Managing governance among a
group of partners can prove challenging as enterprises will
differ in their priorities, profit and loss models, and business
processes [69]. Aligning standards, designing consistent codes
of conduct across industries, and ensuring stakeholders of all
sizes have input [70]. Successful governance should encourage
the continued development of industry standards, formal
business processes, and other best practices.
However, governance is an expansive topic and there continue
to be misconceptions about the core concept. Allen and Berg
[71] argue that “blockchain governance relates to the way
decisions are made, not the decisions themselves – who
chooses and how choices are made, rather than what is
chosen.” Successful consortia require endogenous and
exogenous governance mechanisms [71]. Endogenous
governance refers to consensus mechanisms and other control
procedures built into blockchain platforms. Exogenous
governance refers to formal and informal agreements about
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

the network itself, such as processes for admitting new
participants or voting on platform changes. Tasca and Tessone
[72] also recognise external factors affecting governance,
including regulatory frameworks and industry policies. Van
Pelt et al. [73] describe three layers of governance: on-chain
protocol, which refers to rules encoded in the platform; offchain development, which refers to the real-world processes
related to governance of the protocol; and off-chain
community, which refers to how the broader community
defines and is tied to the blockchain.
Blockchain networks have many stakeholders, who pursue
unique outcomes through participation in blockchain
consortia. Governance helps coordinate the rights,
responsibilities, actions, and incentives of diverse stakeholders
with the overarching goal of network survival and growth.
Blockchain governance agreements have the potential to
support or even replace traditional forms of corporate
governance such as legal contracts or behavioural norms [1].
Blockchain governance agreements therefore may be of
interest to C-level executives and boards. Van Pelt et al. [73]
provide a framework for blockchain governance based on
extensive research and validation. The framework has six
major components: formation and context reflecting the
blockchain purpose and ideology, roles that determine
responsibilities and accountability, incentives that motivate
community members, membership processes for blockchain
participation, communication relating to coordination and
performance, and decision-making processes such as
consensus and conflict resolution. Successful blockchain
consortia must possess the capability to effectively enact and
manage each of these six components, which will begin prior
to the formation of the consortium and continue as it evolves.

3.2.3

Technology

Whether the consortium builds its own platform or relies on a
software-as-a-service provider, technical expertise will be
required to support normal platform activities and innovations
to improve the functioning of the blockchain network. The
consortium must possess the skills necessary to support the
existing demands on a blockchain system, both at its inception
and as the network grows, when partners join and leave, and
platform functionality evolves.
The technological skills necessary to incorporate innovation
through fundamental changes to the blockchain architecture is
also a necessary consortium-level capability. Blockchain evolves
rapidly. Improvements to core mechanisms of the underlying
blockchain technology continue at a rapid pace. Examples
include improvements to consensus mechanisms, data storage
solutions, and protocols for interoperability that enable the
sharing of assets and processes across networks. Technologists
need the ability to stay abreast of these developments and to
determine their appropriateness and compatibility with existing
consortia structures and goals. When these innovations can
provide significant benefits, technologists will need to plan and
oversee system changes. Blockchain technology is still new, and
innovations in the capacity and uses of these systems are
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continually introduced. A consortium needs the ability to
understand how such innovation might enable or constrain the
achievement of its strategic vision and develop plans to respond
and adapt accordingly.

3.2.4

Strategic

Effective consortia need a shared strategic vision and mission
to ensure success. Ongoing effectiveness requires the ability to
manage and redesign the ecosystem’s mission, respond to
ecosystem learning, and adapt to environmental changes.
Successful deployment of blockchain solutions “requires a
shift to thinking in terms of the ecosystem” and a mindset that
“allows organisations to move beyond what’s traditionally
possible for them within the confines of their own vertically
integrated operations” [66]. A consortium must possess
strategic capabilities to manage performance at the ecosystem
level.
Strategic factors that influence the success of a blockchain
consortium are many and varied. The consortium needs the
capacity to sense opportunities and risks, which may include the
introduction of competing consortia, partners joining and
leaving the network, evolution of trade or industry standards,
or new regulations. Consortia without the ability to respond to
these risks will struggle to succeed within a rapidly changing
marketplace. Working with IT, strategists can benefit from
regularly scanning the environment for technological
developments in blockchain and related technologies. The
integration of IoT and artificial intelligence for writing and
analysing records may promote the goals of the consortium
and its stakeholders. Strategists should also foresee potential
benefits that arise as the network scales and plan to translate
into financial returns. Revenue-generating opportunities and
new ways to monetise data should be anticipated and explored.
Lessons can be learned from new use cases in related, or
unrelated, contexts that have parallel sets of goals and
constraints.
Successful consortia not only need to manage risk and seek
out new opportunities; they need to be able to reconfigure the
consortium accordingly. Effective digital transformation and
dynamic learning capabilities enable blockchain participants to
effectively form and execute strategies to capitalise on
emerging risks and opportunities. Effective change
management will require collaboration and coordination with
consortium stakeholders about shifts in situational assessment,
governance, and technology. Communication with consortium
stakeholders will be crucial as changes are proposed with shifts
in responsibilities and impact [74].
The success of a consortium hinges on its ability to create
value for its participants, the broader ecosystem, and its
partners. A consortium’s ability to evaluate both network and
individual member outcomes is of crucial importance. While
the value proposition is addressed before a company decides
to participate, evaluation mechanisms must be in place to
determine whether the project lives up to expectations for
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

costs and value creation. These evaluations inform the need
for changes in governance and direct collaboration with other
partners. Naqvi and Hussain [58] outline a process for
blockchain evaluation based on widely accepted, evidencebased research and evaluation processes. They suggest
effective evaluation comes from a clear definition of the
problems to be addressed and a critical evaluation of both
existing solutions and the new system at the initiation of the
blockchain project [58]. Ongoing analysis of project
performance provides evidence that can be assessed by current
stakeholders as well as by independent evaluators.
3.3 Outcomes
Participation in blockchain consortia provides a broad range
of outcomes for both individual participants and the broader
ecosystem. We separate these outcomes into three categories.
The first is partner operations, which refers to direct effects of
the blockchain on day-to-day activities. The second is partner
impacts, which are the longer-term financial and other impacts
enabled by participation in the consortium. Third is ecosystem
value. The ecosystem itself, with its growing database of
blockchain transactions and network participation, generates
value in a number of ways.

3.3.1

Partner Operations

Exploring the whole range of direct and indirect benefits and
costs is essential for understanding the potential or realised
value of an enterprise blockchain for its participants. Commonly
discussed benefits include increased efficiency, reduced costs
and risks, and enhanced customer experience [74].
Process improvements are often the driver for blockchain
implementation and participation. The ability to track each
action in a workflow renders processes visible and creates
opportunities for improvement. Evaluation of potential
blockchain benefits often begins with the identification of pain
points and frictions. The potential for an accurate, agreedupon transaction record to reduce paperwork-processing
dispute resolution is a common source of improvement, as is
the disintermediation resulting from reduced need for external
verification. Similar to the implementation of ERP systems,
participation in blockchain consortia encourages companies to
reengineer their business processes for the blockchain
environment [75].
A focus on business integration encourages participants in an
enterprise blockchain to re-think and reengineer both external
and internal company processes [56]. In some cases,
consortium participation enables processes to be shared or
outsourced. For example, when one blockchain partner
performs a “Know Your Customer” analysis to comply with
anti-money laundering regulations, other partners can rely on
that analysis and avoid incurring additional costs to trade with
the customer. The adoption of industry best practices through
process standardisation provides another opportunity for
performance improvement [75].
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Security enhancements available in blockchain environments
further affect operations for many partners. Data, digital assets,
and intellectual property can be secured and authenticated using
cryptography, and consensus models reduce the potential for
destruction or alteration of information [29, 30]. Decentralised
identity functionality enables enhanced privacy for customers,
employees, and transacting partners. It also enhances
opportunities to minimise sensitive data collected and stored
and reduces the need to secure such data. The level of
cybersecurity maturity among participants increases through the
validated provenance of all intercompany transactions recorded
on the blockchain. In some cases, such agreements can be
executed automatically [18].

3.3.2

Partner Outcomes

Blockchain use cases vary in their objectives and significance
for blockchain partners. In some cases, blockchain solutions
are integral to firm strategy. In other cases, they lead to
economic outcomes, new or reformed relationships with
consortium partners, and environmental and social impacts.
Strategic benefits can be gained in a number of ways. Adoption
of blockchain technologies may contribute to reputational
effects, as firms may be seen as forward-thinking or they may
affect the firm’s strategic goals directly. Yuthas et al. [6]
provide examples of companies that have strengthened
strategic capabilities in several ways. Some partners have built
upon existing capabilities, for example, by using provenancebased systems to validate product claims. Others have built
blockchain-specific capabilities such as developing expertise or
consortium governance that can extend to future projects.
Consortium platforms have also been used to share data and
strategic resources, leading to the development of new projects
and strengthened partner relationships.
Economic benefits arise through a variety of avenues.
Operational improvement derives from reduced costs through
the elimination of processes and intermediaries, or enhanced
efficiency through process performance and reduced risk.
Improvements in transparency and visibility improve planning
and increase predictability in ways that enhance asset utilisation
and delay the need for new capital investments [26, 44].
Improvements in service responsiveness and quality that result
from redesigned processes can increase revenue by attracting
new customers and reducing turnover. New products and
business models can help partners to serve new markets or
enhance services to existing markets. All of these changes allow
firms to create and capture new sources of value.
Relational outcomes realised through ties between partners are
established or strengthened through strategic collaborations
[76]. Consortium participants may collaborate in a variety of
ways. Smart contract-based business arrangements reduce the
cost associated with establishing and maintaining trust with
trade partners and improve relationships at the firm level [75].
The blockchain-driven redesign of business processes can also
facilitate new relationships at the firm level. Participation in
The JBBA | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | 2021

consortium-level initiatives can build relationships as members
work together to resolve governance and technological issues.
Strategic alliance experience suggests that relationships formed
through one project can carry over to other collaborative
efforts.
Environmental and social outcomes also result from blockchain
efficiencies. Reduced use of paper resulting from increased
digitalisation is a small but not trivial example of creating more
sustainable business operations. Outcomes will vary by firm
and industry, but can be significant. For example, the Digital
Shipping Container Association (DCSA) is developing
standards for a system that will help carriers move away from
“hurry up and wait” itineraries towards reaching ports just in
time to unload. This change has the potential to significantly
reduce excessive use of fuel and, in turn, greenhouse gas
emissions [77]. Digitalisation and blockchain-enabled
connectivity in the maritime sector can be pivotal in reducing
the industry’s collective carbon footprint [78].

3.3.3

Ecosystem Value

Blockchain systems also create outcomes at the ecosystem
level, providing potential benefits for all consortium members.
Blockchain partnerships can take many forms, including
relational agreements among participants and for-profit
entities. Regardless of the specific form, a consortium will
incur costs of operations and generate value at the ecosystem
level, some of which can be distributed to partners.
Forrester’s Total Economic Impact model identifies basic
elements of direct economic benefits from blockchain systems in a
study commissioned by IBM [79]. Costs of delivering a
blockchain solution include costs of the pilot phase, costs of
bringing the solution to commercial scale, and the ongoing
costs of maintaining the system. Benefits to the blockchain
provider or ecosystem include fees for joining the network,
ongoing membership fees, and transaction and contract
execution fees paid by partners for using the system.
Participation in blockchain consortia requires companies to
shift focus away from capturing value through competition
and towards the systemic benefits provided by collaboration. The
collaboration supported by an enterprise blockchain can
provide value to all partners by providing access to new,
authenticated, and vetted trading partners on the network.
Although these benefits are realised by individual companies,
they are created by the consortium. Blockchain systems
provide access to technological capabilities that may otherwise
be unavailable to individual firms, particularly small producers
that can pay membership and transaction fees but do not
possess advanced skills or technology. Ecosystems enable
sharing and reduction of regulatory, compliance, and lobbying
costs as well as the costs of developing and implementing
standards.
Improvements in performance for ecosystem partners provide
additional benefits for partner stakeholders. Customers, for
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example, will ultimately benefit from increased efficiency and
quality. Ecosystem success may likewise be associated with
improved utilisation of assets and reduced waste across the
network. This can provide both economic and environmental
benefits as the footprint for the production and delivery of
goods is decreased [80].
4. Conclusion
Companies are investing heavily in exploring blockchain
technologies, and industry projections suggest a rapid growth
of these technologies in numerous verticals. For this vision to
be realised, business capabilities must catch up to
technological capabilities. Business processes must be
redesigned to take advantage of the many benefits the
technology can provide. Organisations and their leaders must
learn to effectively form and govern consortia and associated
relationships.
The consortium capabilities framework presented in this
chapter provides an overview of core business elements that
can promote blockchain success. By developing and
employing these capabilities at the firm and network levels,
consortia can better realise the promise of this still-new
technology. This framework fills a current void in the literature
by providing a practical set of guidelines for companies and
consortia to consider when building and maintaining their
networks.
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